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Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth
with Consumption Externalities
K. Horiy and A. Shibataz
Abstract. This paper introduces consumption externalities into an
endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and char-
acterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argu-
ment in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback
Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equi-
librium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This
result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit “keeping up with
the Joneses” or “running away from the Joneses”.
Key Words. Dierential game, Consumption externalities, Endogenous growth,
Open-loop Nash equilibrium, Feedback Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
In the literature on commons games, it is usually argued that the lack of agents’
commitment to their future actions leads to the so-called tragedy of the com-
mons; that is, if agents condition their actions on the basis of the aggregate stock
of the commons, rather than committing themselves to initial decisions that de-
pends only on the aggregate stock of the commons, then this could worsen the
overconsumption and/or underinvestment of the commons. For example, Gordon
(Ref. 1) is the first study that presents an example of the tragedy of the com-
mons. Fershtman and Nitzan (Ref. 2) and Levhari and Mirman (Ref. 3) develop
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a dynamic model of the voluntary provision of public goods and show that con-
ditioning each agent’s contribution on the collective contributions aggravates the
degree of the free-rider problem. Using endogenous growth models, Tornell and
Velasco (Ref. 4) and Shibata (Ref. 5) show that the balanced growth rate with-
out commitment is lower than that with commitment. Moreover, Benhabib and
Radner (Ref. 6), Cozzi (Ref. 7), Dockner and Sorger (Ref. 8), Sorger (Ref. 9),
Vencatachellum (Ref. 10), Vencatachellum (Ref. 11), Dockner and Nishimura
(Ref. 12), and Luckraz (Ref. 13) study the other aspects of equilibria in similar
situations. However, contrary to the literature, our daily experience and obser-
vation tell us that monitoring behavior mitigates the free-rider problem: e.g., the
behavior of agents conditioned on natural resource investigations tends to raise the
growth rates of natural resource stocks. Therefore, this paper develops a simple
dynamic game model of common capital accumulation with consumption exter-
nalities that can explain our daily experience and observation.
The existence of consumption externalities is emphasized in an early work
by Veblen (Ref. 14) and validated as a determinant of aggregate consumption
by Duesenberry (Ref. 15). Moreover, many recent studies analyze the eects of
consumption externalities. For example, to reconcile the equity premium puz-
zle, Abel (Ref. 16), Constantinides (Ref. 17), and Galı´ (Ref. 18) incorporate the
consumption externalities into consumption-based asset pricing models. Liu and
Turnovsky (Ref. 19), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (Ref. 20), Turnovsky and Monteiro
(Ref. 21), and Mino (Ref. 22) construct growth models with consumption exter-
nalities. In addition to these theoretical and calibration studies, there is much
empirical evidence showing the importance of consumption externalities in the
real world. Kosicki (Ref. 23) finds that an individual’s regional income rank sig-
nificantly aects his consumption behavior; Clark and Oswald (Ref. 24) find that
workers’ satisfaction levels negatively depend on the relative wage rates. Using
the data of the United States, Europe, and Japan, Easterlin (Ref. 25) finds support-
ive evidence of the existence of consumption externalities. Moreover, based on
experiments, Kagel, Kim, and Moser (Ref. 26) and Zizzo and Oswald (Ref. 27)
find that economic agents’ utilities depend on their relative income levels. Along
this line of research, we introduce consumption externalities into a dynamic game
model of endogenous growth and analyze how the introduction of the externalities
modifies the standard results on the growth rates with and without commitment.
Although there are very few studies that investigate the role of consumption
externalities in the frameworks of the dynamic game theory, Wirl and Feichtinger
(Ref. 28) and Futagami and Shinkai (Ref. 29) are exceptions. They develop dier-
ential game models with consumption externalities and examine the eects of the
consumption externalities on equilibrium dynamics in a similar way to ours. How-
ever, our model is significantly dierent from theirs and more general than theirs.
Dupor and Liu (Ref. 30) classify the eects of consumption externalities into four
2
cases: jealousy, admiration, “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ), and “running
away from the Joneses” (RAJ). Since Wirl and Feichtinger (Ref. 28) use a utility
function that is additively separable between the agent’s and others’ consumption,
their model inherently excludes the KUJ/RAJ characteristics of consumption ex-
ternalities. Moreover, their model is not an endogenous growth one. Futagami and
Shinkai (Ref. 29) construct a similar endogenous growth model to ours. However,
in their specification of utility, admiration is always equivalent to KUJ and jeal-
ousy is equivalent to RAJ, and thus only two cases can be analyzed. In contrast to
these studies, our model distinguishes the four types of consumption externalities
and can analyze their implication on the economic growth rate.
2 Model
In this paper, we use only the scalar-valued functions, parameters, and variables.
There are N homogenous agents in our economy. They jointly produce a good by
using common capital and divide it into consumption and common capital accu-
mulation. The lifetime utility function of each agent is assumed to be additively
separable in time. The agent subjective discount rate is denoted by  and the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution is represented by . Therefore, the problem of
agent i is to maximize the following lifetime utility:Z 1
0
ui exp( t)dt; i = 1; : : : ;N. (1)
Here, ui denotes the instantaneous utility function and is specified as
ui =

   1
 
cic¯
 
i
1  1 ; i = 1; : : : ;N;
where ci : R+ ! R+ is continuously dierentiable; c¯i = P j,i c j=(N   1); ;  2
R++; and  2 ( 1; 1). Here, ci is the consumption of agent i and c¯i is the level of
average consumption of other agents, which represents the externalities from other
agents’ consumption. The parameter  represents the magnitude of the external
eects of consumption. Following Dupor and Liu (Ref. 30), we put the following
definitions concerning the characteristics of consumption externalities.
Definition 2.1. We say that consumption externalities indicate
1. jealousy if @ui=@c¯i < 0 ( > 0) and admiration if @ui=@c¯i > 0 ( < 0).
2. “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) if @2ui=@ci@c¯i > 0 ((1   ) > 0) and
“running away from the Jones” (RAJ) if @2ui=@ci@c¯i < 0 ((1   ) < 0).
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The definitions of jealousy and admiration are intuitively interpreted as fol-
lows. If the utility of an agent decreases as others’ consumption rises, we can
state that preferences exhibit jealousy. An example that leads to this situation is
pollution which is increasing in consumption: the utility of a country decreases as
other countries’ consumption increases. On the other hand, if the utility increases
as others’ consumption increases, we state that preferences exhibit admiration. We
can easily imagine several situations in which this form of utility function is ratio-
nalized. Consider, for example, international public goods, such as peace keeping,
public health, or environmental preservation, the role of which is emphasized by
Kindleberger (Ref. 31). If the international public goods are financed by con-
sumption tax, the utility of a country is an increasing function of the tax revenues
of other countries, that is, an increasing function of other countries’ consumption.
Similarly, if the marginal utility increases as others’ consumption rises, we
state that preferences exhibit KUJ, and, if not we state that preferences exhibit
RAJ. Here, note that, by the specification of our instantaneous utility function,
our model fully and separately specifies the jealousy/admiration and KUJ/RAJ
characteristics of consumption externalities, and thus, it has significant dier-
ences from the literature: Wirl and Feichtinger (Ref. 28) treat only the case that
@2ui=@ci@c¯i = 0 and Futagami and Shinkai (Ref. 29) do only the case that
sign@2ui=@ci@c¯i = sign@ui=@c¯i.
The production technology has the Ak form, and therefore, the dynamics of
the common capital stock is
˙k = Ak  
NX
j=1
c j, given k0; (2)
where k : R+ ! R+, k0 2 R++, and A 2 R++. Here, k denotes the stock of common
capital, k0 is its initial value, and A is a constant productivity parameter. If each
agent chooses a symmetric strategy, we have c = ci for all i = 1;    ;N. In this
case, from (2), the growth rate g can be written as
g = N (!SS   !) , (3)
where !SS = A=N and ! = c=k. Throughout this paper, we assume the following
condition.
Assumption 2.1. A, , , N, and  satisfy
 <

A
< min
 
1;
1   
N
!
, (4)
where  = (1   )(1   1=).
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Assumption 2.1 ensures that the problem is well defined, since the value func-
tion of each agent is well defined by Assumption 2.1. Moreover, this also en-
sures the rate of balanced growth is positive. If the value function did not have
a finite value, the other concepts of optimality should be required: e.g., Stern
(Ref. 32); Seierstad and Sydsæter (Ref. 33); Dockner, Jorgensen, van Long, and
Sorger (Ref. 34).
3 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
We first consider a situation where agents commit themselves to their announced
actions.
Definition 3.1. An N-tuple of consumption paths, (c1; : : : ; cN), is called an open-
loop Nash equilibrium if, for each i = 1; : : : ;N, the ci maximize (1) subject to
(2).
An open-loop Nash equilibrium is a plausible equilibrium concept in the situ-
ation where agents cannot observe the value of common capital at each time, and
thus, condition their strategies only on the basis of the initial value of common
capital, and precommit themselves to their future consumption paths. For ex-
ample, this kind of the situation may occur when agents have to pay high cost to
observe the current amount of the common capital, thereby they give up observing
the current amount of infrastructure and adopt the open-loop Nash strategy.
To solve the problem, we define the following current value Hamiltonian:
Hi =

   1
 
cic¯
 
i
1  1 + qoi
0BBBBBB@Ak   NX
j=1
c j
1CCCCCCA ,
where qoi is the costate variable of the common capital. Here, note that the Hamil-
tonian is concave with respect to ci and k under Assumption 2.1, and thus, the
following conditions are necessary and sucient conditions for maximization.
The optimality conditions for this problem are given as
c
  1
i c¯
 

1  1

i = q
o
i ; (5)
Aqoi = qoi   q˙oi ; (6)
lim
t!1 q
o
i k exp( t) = 0: (7)
At equilibrium, it follows from (5) and (6) that c = c¯i = ci for all i = 1;    ;N;
thus, the Euler equation is given as
c˙
c
=
A   
1    .
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Therefore, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1. The growth rate in the open-loop Nash equilibrium is given by
go =
A   
1    . (8)
Proof. From (3), (5), (6), we obtain the balanced growth rate in this open-loop
Nash equilibrium. 
Note that, from conditions (5) to (7), we have a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium in this model. It is also easy to show that the open-loop Nash equilibrium
is Pareto ecient. This eciency result is similar to that derived by Chiarella,
Kemp, van Long, and Okuguchi (Ref. 35), who show, contrary to the traditional
view, that an open-loop Nash equilibrium can be socially ecient in various situ-
ations.
Finally, we put the following corollary to clarify the eects of the consumption
externalities on the growth rate in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.1. The growth rate in the open-loop Nash equilibrium is increasing
in  if preferences exhibit jealousy and KUJ or if admiration and RAJ.
Here, it should be noted that the above corollary is given only if all aspects of
consumption externalities are fully specified.
4 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
We next consider the case where each agent does not commit himself to his future
actions. This case can be analyzed by applying the feedback Nash equilibrium
concept, which allows agents to choose and expect optimal consumption paths
that depend on the current stock of common capital at each time.
Definition 4.1. An N-tuple of consumption paths, (c1; : : : ; cN), is called a feedback
Nash equilibrium if, for each i = 1; : : : ;N, the ci maximize (1) subject to (2) and
c j = c j(k) for j , i.
Note that the feedback Nash equilibrium implies that agents can monitor the
stock of common capital, and they condition their future consumption paths on the
value of the common capital at each time. We solve the feedback Nash equilibrium
by using dynamic programming. To solve the problem, we first define the value
function of agent i. Given the stock of common capital k and the consumption
6
path of agent i in the feedback Nash equilibrium (ci ), the value function Ui(k) is
given as
Ui(k) =
Z 1
t

   1
 
ci c¯i(k) 
1  1 exp ( (s   t)) ds, (9)
where c¯i(k) = P j,i c j(k)=(N   1) and c j(k) is the feedback strategy of agent j.
Hence, if the value function is continuously dierentiable, the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation of this problem is given as
Ui(k) = max
ci
26666664    1  cic¯i(k) 1  1 + q fi
0BBBBBB@Ak   NX
j=1
c j
1CCCCCCA
37777775 , (10)
where q fi = dUi=dk. From (10), the first-order condition is obtained as
c
  1
i c¯i(k) 

1  1

= q fi (k). (11)
In what follows, we consider the equilibrium in linear and nonlinear strategies.
4.1 Equilibrium in Linear Strategies
In this subsection, we consider equilibrium where the agents adopt the following
symmetric linear strategy.
c(k) = k + , (12)
where  and  are constants. In this situation, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If agents adopt the linear strategy defined in (12), it holds that, for
any k 2 R+,
!BGP =
    A
1       N (13)
and
U(k) = 1
 
!
  1
BGPk
 ; (14)
where !BGP denotes the ratio of consumption to common capital in the case that
the agents adopt the linear strategy.
Proof. From (11), it holds that, at equilibrium,
U(k) = 1
 
c(k) + , (15)
where  denotes an integral constant. By using (11) and (15), (9) can be rewritten
as

 
c(k) +  =
 

   1   N + A
k
k + 
!
c(k) .
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Therefore, for the above equality to hold for any value of k, it must hold that
 =  = 0 and  =     A
1       N . (16)
Thus, by substituting (16) into (12) and (15), we have (13) and (14), respectively.

From Lemma 4.1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. There exists a linear feedback Nash equilibrium, where agents
adopt the linear strategy defined in (12) and the growth rate in the feedback Nash
equilibrium is positive and given as
g
f
BGP = N (!SS   !BGP) , (17)
where g fBGP denotes the growth rate of the economy.
Proof. If agents adopt (12), Lemma 4.1 holds. Therefore, substituting (13) into
(3), we get
˙k
k =
c˙
c
= A +
N ( A   )
1       N = N (!SS   !BGP) ,
where !SS > !BGP by Assumption 2.1. Next, we check that (17) satisfies the
terminal condition. From (14) in Lemma 4.1 and (17), we get
U(k) = 1
 
!
  1
BGPk
 
0 exp
 
 

A(1   )   N
1       N t
!
.
Therefore, we have
lim
t!1 U(k) exp ( t) = limt!1
1
 
!
  1
BGPk
 
0 exp ((   1)!BGPt) = 0
since  < 1 and !BGP > 0 by the assumptions. Finally, it is easily checked from
(14) in Lemma 4.1 that the value function is continuously dierentiable and the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (10) is well defined. This implies that (14)
actually gives the maximum value of the problem.1 
We put the following corollary to clarify the eects of the consumption exter-
nalities on the growth rate in the feedback Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 4.1. The growth rate in the feedback Nash equilibrium is increasing in
 if preferences exhibit jealousy and KUJ or if admiration and RAJ.
Again, it should be noted that the above corollary is obtained only when all
aspects of consumption externalities are fully specified.
1See Theorem 4.1 in Dockner et al. (Ref. 34).
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4.2 Equilibrium in Nonlinear Strategies
This subsection considers a more general case where agents adopt symmetric non-
linear strategies. As in the literature, e.g. Tsutsui and Mino (Ref. 36), Dockner
and Sorger (Ref. 8), Sorger (Ref. 9), Vencatachellum (Ref. 11), and Itaya and
Shimomura (Ref. 37), our model also has a continuum of feedback Nash equi-
libria with nonlinear strategies. However, the property of the equilibrium in our
model is in contrast with that of the literature.
Lemma 4.2. In a symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium, it holds that
k = Zc
A
A  (1  ) +
c
!BGP
, (18)
where Z 2 R denotes an integral constant.
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, it follows from (11) that (10) can be written
as
U =
 

   1   N
!
q f
 
  1 + q f Ak. (19)
In light of (4), note that the coecient of the first term on the right-hand side of the
above equation is positive. Therefore, since (19) is the D’Alembert (or Lagrange)
equation, the solution of (19) satisfies the following equation:
k = Zq f  
A
A  +
1       N
    A q
f 1  1
. (20)
Again, using (11), we get (18). Here, it should be noted that, by its construction,
the consumption paths derived from (20) guarantee the existence and continu-
ous dierentiability of q f on a plausible domain. Therefore, as in Tsutsui and
Mino (Ref. 36), the sucient conditions for optimality is satisfied on the plau-
sible domain since it implies that k is absolutely continuous on [0;1) and U is
continuously dierentiable.2 
The sign of Z in Lemma 4.2 plays a crucial role in characterizing the dynamics
of the economy, as will be clear in the statement in the last part of this section.
Lemma 4.2 gives the dynamics of the economy as follows.
Proposition 4.2. The dynamics of consumption in a symmetric feedback Nash
equilibrium is characterized by (3) and
c˙
c
=
N(A   )(!SS   !)
(1       N) (!UB   !) , (21)
2See Theorem 4.1 in Dockner et al. (Ref. 34) for the sucient condition for optimality.
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where
!UB =
(1    )A
1       N .
Proof. The equation ! = !UB is not feasible, since it violates the dierentiability
of c; hereby we assume that ! , !UB in the following analyses. From Lemma
4.2, in the symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium, we have (18). Rearranging (18)
yields
Z =
 
k   c
!BGP
!
c
A
A  (  1)
.
Taking the logarithm of both sides of the above equation and dierentiating them
with respect to t, we have
˙k
k =
(!UB   !) 1       NA   
c˙
c
.
Therefore, by substituting (3) into the above equation, we have (21). 
Note that (21) is a necessary condition for the symmetric feedback Nash equi-
librium, since it is derived from the first-order condition (11). Therefore, we need
to check that the consumption path characterized by (21) satisfies the terminal
condition to ensure it is optimal. The following proposition verifies that the con-
sumption paths characterized by (21) satisfy the terminal condition. Before we
state Proposition 4.3, we put the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. In the symmetric feedback Nash equilibrium, it holds that
!˙ =
N (!BGP   !) (!   !SS)!
!UB   ! . (22)
Proof. Since ! = !UB is not feasible, we assume here that ! , !UB. Subtracting
(3) from (21), we have
!˙
!
=
c˙
c
  ˙kk =
N (!BGP   !) (!   !SS)
!UB   ! .
The above equation completes the proof. 
Therefore, the dynamics of the economy is the same as that of !. Denote the
growth rates of consumption and common capital in feedback Nash equilibrium
by g fc and g fk , respectively. Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.
(i) In the case !0 = !BGP, the growth rate in the feedback Nash equilibrium is
given by (17).
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(ii) In the case !0 > !BGP, the feedback Nash equilibria converge to steady
states if 1    < N: g fc ! 0 and g fk ! 0 as t ! 1.
(iii) In the case ! < !BGP, the growth rates in the feedback Nash equilibrium
converge to that in the open-loop Nash equilibrium (8): g fc ! go and g fk ! A
as t ! 1,
where !0 denotes the initial ratio of c to k: ! = !0 at t = 0.
Proof. (i) !0 = !BGP. Substituting !0 = !BGP into (3) and (21) in Proposition
4.2 gives the result.
(ii) !0 > !BGP. See Appendix.
(iii) !0 < !BGP. It follows from (22) that !˙ < 0 for all ! < !BGP and that !˙ = 0
at ! = 0. Since this implies ! ! 0 as t ! 1, equation (3) and Proposition
4.2 yield
lim
t!1 g
f
k = N (!SS   !) = A and limt!1 g
f
c =
N(A   )!SS
(1       N)!UB =
A   
1    .
The right-hand side of the second equation is the same as the growth rate in
the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Therefore, it satisfies the terminal condi-
tion under Assumption 2.1.

Figure 1 is the phase diagram in the case that 1    < N. The solid curves in
Figure 1 depict the loci of capital and consumption satisfying (18) corresponding
to various values of !0 (or Z) in Proposition 4.2. The BGP line plots the locus of
capital and consumption in the case that !0 = !BGP (Z = 0), and the curves above
and below the BGP line depict the loci in the case that !0 > !BGP (Z < 0) and
!0 < !BGP (Z > 0), respectively. The SS line depicts the ˙k = 0 (! = !SS) locus,
and thus, ˙k > 0 when a path is located below the line and ˙k < 0 when it lies in the
area above the line. The slope of the SS line is larger than that of the BGP line by
Assumption 2.1. It should also be noted that the SS line in the case !0 > !BGP
lies in the area below the UB line. The UB line plots ! = !UB, at which the slope
of the peaks of the curves drawn from (18) become infinite.
The case !0 = !BGP corresponds to the balanced growth path. Note that a
balanced growth is realized only when !0 = !BGP. Here, it should be noted
that the growth rate in this case coincides with (17); thus, it satisfies the terminal
condition.
In the case !0 > !BGP, since the paths in the area above the UB line move
up in the north-west direction along the curves drawn from (18) and reach the
vertical axis in a finite period, the equilibrium paths drawn from (18) must lie
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between the UB and BGP lines. Moreover, since the paths between the UB and
SS lines move down in the south-west direction and the paths between the SS and
BGP lines move up in the north-east direction along the curves, the equilibrium
paths converge to the SS line. This implies that there are infinitely many feedback
Nash equilibria which converge to corresponding steady states. Note that these
equilibrium paths are not Markov perfect in the strict sense, since the domain of
each path does not span the entire state space. Although there are some approaches
that these paths is made Markov perfect by artificial operations (e.g. Itaya and
Shimomura (Ref. 37) and Clemhout and Wan Jr. (Ref. 38)), our attention is mainly
focused to the next case.
In the case !0 < !BGP, the paths must be below the BGP line and move
up in the north-east direction along the curves. Along these curves, the growth
rates converge to the balanced growth path in the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, as in Shibata (Ref. 5), we find that there also exist infinitely many
nonbalanced growth paths in the feedback Nash equilibrium.
5 Comparison of the Growth Rates in Open-Loop
and Feedback Nash Equilibria
5.1 Linear Strategies
As Tornell and Velasco (Ref. 4) and Shibata (Ref. 5) illustrate, in an economy
without consumption externalities, the balanced growth rate in the feedback Nash
equilibrium is lower than that in the open-loop Nash equilibrium. In this section,
we show that the existence of consumption externalities may destroy this relation-
ship between the two equilibrium growth rates.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumption 2.1, it holds that
g
f
BGP > g
o
if and only if
 < 1   N. (23)
Proof. To compare the growth rates in the open-loop and feedback Nash equilib-
ria, presented respectively in (8) and (17), we calculate their dierence:
g
f
BGP   go =
!BGP
1    (1      N) . (24)
Since the first multiplying term is positive by Assumption 2.1, the growth rate in
the feedback Nash equilibrium becomes higher than that in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium if and only if (23) holds. 
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Note that, under (23), we can always choose the value of  to satisfy (4); that is,
we can prove that, in this model, there exists a situation in which (24) is positive.
Since N > 1, (23) states that the growth rate in the feedback Nash equilibrium is
higher than that in the open-loop Nash equilibrium if preferences exhibit admi-
ration to other agents’ consumption. This result shows that, although the growth
rate in the feedback Nash equilibrium is lower than that in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium as generally argued, the presence of strong admiration reverses the
conclusion.
Intuitively, the presence of jealousy implies that the utility of agents decreases
with an increase of the others’ consumption. This suggests that the presence of
jealousy is a factor raising their current consumption and reducing their contri-
bution to the accumulation of common capital. On the other hand, the presence
of admiration implies that their utility increases with increase of the others’ con-
sumption, suggesting that admiration is a factor raising contribution to the accu-
mulation of common capital. It shows that the growth rate in the feedback Nash
equilibrium, where agents can change their consumption on the basis of others’
consumption, may be higher than that in the open-loop Nash equilibrium if the
degree of admiration is strong enough. Alternatively, the presence of admiration
can also be interpreted as the other source of the free-rider problem, since they
can enjoy utility from others’ consumption. In this sense, it can be said that the
growth rate without commitment becomes higher than that with commitment if
the free ride on others’ consumption is stronger than that on the common capital
accumulation.
Finally, we put the following proposition concerning KUJ and RAJ.
Proposition 5.1. The relative magnitude of the two growth rates is irrelevant to
whether preferences exhibit KUJ or RAJ.
Proposition 5.1 follows from the fact that (23) does not include the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. It should be noted that the above proposition is
also given only if all aspects of consumption externalities are fully specified.
5.2 Nonlinear Strategies
Finally, we compare the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the nonlinear feedback
Nash equilibrium. It is obvious that the growth rate in the open-loop Nash equi-
librium is higher than that in the feedback Nash equilibrium in the long run in the
case that !0 > !BGP, where consumption and capital stock converge to a steady
state. In the case that !0 < !BGP, the growth rate of common capital converges to
A since ! converges to 0. We have the following theorem on the rate of consump-
tion growth.
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Theorem 5.2. Suppose that !0 < !BGP. Then, there exist infinitely many nonlin-
ear feedback Nash equilibria such that
g fc > g
o and g fk > g
o; 8t 2 R+
if and only if  < 1   N. Here, g f denotes the growth rate of common capital.
Proof. Rearranging (21), we have
g fc =
A   
1    
(1    )A   (1    )N!
(1    )A   (1       N)! .
The above equation implies that g fc > go if and only if (1  )N < 1   N, that
is,  < 1   N.
The fact that g fk > g
o follows from (3), (8), and the fact that !BGP > ! for
all t 2 R, which is derived from the assumptions of the theorem and the third
statement in the proof of Lemma 4.2. 
Therefore, we find the same condition for the ordinal relationship between
growth rates to be destroyed as in the case that agents adopt linear feedback strate-
gies, (23), even if they adopt nonlinear ones.
6 Conclusions
This paper introduced consumption externalities into a dynamic game model of
common capital accumulation. Contrary to the usual argument that the growth
rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium is lower than that in an open-loop Nash equi-
librium, we showed that the growth rates in the feedback Nash equilibria under
both linear and nonlinear strategies could be higher than that in the open-loop
Nash equilibrium if consumption externalities exist: the standard relationship be-
tween the growth rates in the two equilibrium is modified if agents strongly admire
others’ consumption, while the conventional relationship is maintained between
the two growth rates if the agents envy others’ consumption. This modification is
irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit KUJ or RAJ.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.3 in the Case that !0 > !BGP
We assume that 1    < N. In this case, !UB > !SS > !BGP by Assumption 2.1. We
investigate (22) by examining two cases.
Case 1. !0 > !UB. In this case, it holds that
!˙  !˙0 > 0,
and thus, it follows from (3) that
˙k
k  A   N!0 < 0.
Therefore, the value of k reaches 0 in finite time. Since this implies that (18)
cannot hold for any c 2 R+ at some finite time, we exclude this case as a feedback
Nash equilibrium.
Case 2. !UB > !0 > !BGP. In this case,
!˙ < 0 if !0 > !SS
and
!˙ > 0 if !0 < !SS.
Therefore, !! !SS as t ! 1, where
!˙ = ˙k = c˙ = 0.
The terminal condition is obviously satisfied in this case.
15
References
1. H.S. Gordon. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 62(2):124–142, 1954.
2. C. Fershtman and S. Nitzan. Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.
European Economic Review, 35:1057–1067, 1991.
3. D. Levhari and L.J. Mirman. The Great Fish War: An Example Using a
Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11(1):322–
334, 1980.
4. A. Tornell and A. Velasco. The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic
Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries? The Journal
of Political Economy, 100(6):1208–1231, 1992.
5. A. Shibata. Strategic Interactions in a Growth Model with Infrastructure Cap-
ital. Metroeconomica, 53(4):434–460, 2002.
6. J. Benhabib and R. Radner. The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A
Game-Theoretic Approach. Economic Theory, 2(2):155–190, 1992.
7. G. Cozzi. R&D Cooperation and Growth. Journal of Economic Theory, 86
(1):17–49, 1999.
8. E.J. Dockner and G. Sorger. Existence and Properties of Equilibria for a
Dynamic Game on Productive Assets. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):
209–227, 1996.
9. G. Sorger. Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Resource Games.
Economic Theory, 11(1):79–100, 1998.
10. D. Vencatachellum. Endogenous Growth with Strategic Interactions. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 23(2):233–254, 1998.
11. D. Vencatachellum. A Dierential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-
Based Growth Models. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 96
(1):175–189, 1998.
12. E.J. Dockner and K. Nishimura. Capital Accumulation Games with a Non-
concave Production Function. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion, 57(4):408–420, 2005.
13. S. Luckraz. Process Spillovers and Growth. Journal of Optimization Theory
and Applications, 2008. online first.
16
14. T. Veblen. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Macmillan, New York, 1912.
15. J.S. Duesenberry. Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1949.
16. A.B. Abel. Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the
Joneses. The American Economic Review, 80(2):38–42, 1990.
17. G.M. Constantinides. Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium
Puzzle. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(3):519–543, 1990.
18. J. Galı´. Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio
Choice, and Asset Prices. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 26(1):1–8,
1994.
19. W.F. Liu and S.J. Turnovsky. Consumption Externalities, Production Exter-
nalities, and Long-Run Macroeconomic Eciency. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 89(5–6):1097–1129, 2005.
20. L. Ljungqvist and H. Uhlig. Tax Policy and Aggregate Demand Management
under Catching Up with the Joneses. The American Economic Review, 90(3):
356–366, 2000.
21. S.J. Turnovsky and G. Monteiro. Consumption Externalities, Production Ex-
ternalities, and Ecient Capital Accumulation under Time Non-separable
Preferences. European Economic Review, 51(2):479–504, 2007.
22. K. Mino. Growth and Bubbles with Consumption Externalities. Japanese
Economic Review, 59(1):33–53, 2008.
23. G. Kosicki. A Test of the Relative Income Hypothesis. Southern Economic
Journal, pages 422–434, 1987.
24. A.E. Clark and A.J. Oswald. Satisfaction and Comparison Income. Journal
of Public Economics, 61(3):359–381, 1996.
25. R.A. Easterlin. Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of
All? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27(1):35–47, 1995.
26. J.H. Kagel, C. Kim, and D. Moser. Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asym-
metric Information and Asymmetric Payos. Games and Economic Behavior,
13(1):100–110, 1996.
27. D.J. Zizzo and A.J. Oswald. Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others’
Incomes? Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, pages 39–65, 2001.
17
28. F. Wirl and G. Feichtinger. Intrafamiliar Consumption and Saving under Al-
truism and Wealth Considerations. Economica, 69(273):93–111, 2002.
29. K. Futagami and T. Shinkai. A Dynamic Game of Jealousy and Sympathy,
1996. mimeo, Ritsumeikan University.
30. B. Dupor and W.F. Liu. Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption. The
American Economic Review, 93(1):423–428, 2003.
31. C.P. Kindleberger. International Public Goods without International Govern-
ment. The American Economic Review, pages 1–13, 1986.
32. Le Stern. Criteria of Optimality in the Infinite-Time Optimal Control Prob-
lem. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 44(3):497–508, 1984.
33. A. Seierstad and K. Sydsæter. Optimal Control Theory with Economic Appli-
cations. Advanced Textbooks in Economics. North Holland, 3 edition, 1987.
34. E.J. Dockner, S. Jorgensen, N. van Long, and G. Sorger. Dierential Games
in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
35. C. Chiarella, M.C. Kemp, N. van Long, and K. Okuguchi. On the Eco-
nomics of International Fisheries. International Economic Review, 25(1):
85–92, 1984.
36. S. Tsutsui and K. Mino. Nonlinear Strategies in Dynamic Duopolistic Com-
petition with Sticky Prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 52(1):136–161,
1990.
37. J. Itaya and K. Shimomura. A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the
Private Provision of Public Goods: A Dierential Game Approach. Journal
of Public Economics, 81(1):153–172, 2001.
38. S. Clemhout and H.Y. Wan Jr. Endogenous Growth as a Dynamic Game.
In G.J. Olsder, editor, New Trends in Dynamic Games and Applications.
Birkhauser, Boston, MA, 1996.
18
Oc
k
SS
BGP
BGP: c =   A1   N k, SS: c = !SSk, UB: c = !UBk
 =  0:5,  = 4=3,  = 0:5, A = 1, N = 2
UB
Figure 1: Dynamics for feedback Nash equilibrium
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